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The WTO s dispute 
settlement mechanism
by Philip Ruttley
Philip Ruttley describes the way in which international businesses   with 
particular reference to Japanese companies operating in Europe   can use the 
new dispute settlement system of the World Trade Organisation to their 
advantage.
I t is fair to say that the World Trade Organisation (WTO) agreements constitute the most far-reaching set of trade treaties ever created by the international community. The 
WTO agreements range from the new General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade of 1994 (GATT 1994), which is concerned 
with manufactured goods, to an agreement on trade in services, 
the General Agreements on Trading Services (GATS), which 
covers most types of services, with the notable exclusion of 
financial services. However the WTO is currently planning to 
have concluded its negotiations for a financial services 
regulation agreement by December 1997. Now that 
telecommunications services are regulated under the WTO, the 
only major types of services which are not yet regulated by an 
international WTO agreement are aviation and maritime 
services.
Another important WTO agreement is the agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). 
There is also an agreement regulating government procurement, 
another on technical barriers to trade and even an agreement on 
dairy produce. All of these agreements form a package of some 
30,000 pages of treaties which now bind the international 
trading community. They are published together by the WTO in 
one volume: The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations   The Legal Texts (f 995).
WIDE-RANGING SYSTEM
The WTO's membership encompasses most major trading 
nations, with the notable exception of Russia, the People's 
Republic of China, Taiwan and Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, these 
four countries have all applied for WTO membership and it is 
expected that by the year 2000, they should all be WTO 
members.
From a legal point of view, the WTO agreements are a 
revolution in international trade law. One of the central features 
of the WTO system is the creation of what amounts to an 
international trade arbitration tribunal with binding jurisdiction 
on the 130 states which have joined the WTO since its 
establishment in 1994. This new system amounts to a legal 
revolution because the results of the WTO's dispute settlement 
procedures are legally binding on the WTO member states. This
contrasts with a largely flexible and diplomatic nature of dispute 
settlement rulings under the old, pre-1994, GATT system.
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISM
Before going into the technicalities as to how private 
industry can use the WTO system, the WTO's dispute 
settlement mechanism must be explained.
It has several important and novel features. The first feature 
of the new system is that it is an integrated legal system, in so far 
as the WTO agreements are designed to all be regulated under 
the same system. Thus art. 2.1 of the WTO Framework 
Agreement states that:
'the WTO shall provide a common institutional framework Jor the 
conduct of trade relations amongst its members in matters related to the 
[WTO agreements].'
A further feature of the system is that it is careful to describe 
very precisely the hierarchy of legal systems which it contains. 
Thus, unless otherwise provided under the specific agreement 
in question, the WTO is to be:
'guided by the decisions procedures, and customary practices followed 
by the contracting parties to the GATT 1947 and the bodies established 
under the framework of GATT 1947'. (art. 16)
There is also provision for the assignment of legal priority in 
cases of conflicts.
A further feature is that the WTO agreements greatly limit 
unilateral action by states or agreements as between the parties 
of the WTO but outside the WTO dispute settlement system 
(inter-se agreements). Basically WTO disputes must always be 
litigated through the dispute settlement body of the WTO, and 
there are very considerable limits on voluntary restraint 
agreements, or bilateral restraint agreements.
The old GATT dispute settlement system was fundamentally 
weakened by the ability of even the losing state to veto the 
adoption of a recommendation from a GATT panel. So if there 
was a dispute under the old GATT, unless there was a consensus 
of the GATT states to adopt the recommendations of a panel 
ruling on a GATT treaty violation, the report of the panel had 
no legal effect. Unfortunately, many states (particularly 
European Union countries and the US) exercised this right of
veto which rendered the old GATT system largely a diplomatic 
and voluntary agreement.
THE NEW SYSTEM
This system has been completely changed by the WTO 
agreement. Under the new dispute settlement understanding, 
where there is a dispute between WTO states as to the 
implementation of a WTO agreement, the parties are required 
to enter into a first phase of consultation to attempt to find an 
amicable solution to their problems. If that fails, the parties may 
request the WTO to establish a panel to examine the question 
in detail. That panel will hear evidence and arguments of the 
parties and will come to a conclusion with recommendations as 
to how any violation of the WTO agreements that it has found 
to exist should be remedied. The third phase is the possibility of 
an appeal on a point of WTO law to the appellate body which is 
a new creation of the WTO system and is made up of seven 
members who have power to overturn panel recommendations.
The revolutionary novelty of the WTO system is that the 
recommendations of a panel or the rulings of the appellate body 
are legally binding on member states, unless there is a consensus 
of member states not to adopt them. This means that the losing 
state no longer has the right automatically to veto the results of 
a dispute settlement proceeding. It is highly unlikely, if not 
impossible, for the victorious state to veto the adoption of a 
panel or an appellate body ruling. Consequently one can fairly 
conclude that the new WTO system creates a binding dispute 
settlement system for international trade.
GROWTH IN LITIGATION
The new system therefore provides an exciting and 
ultimately very powerful way to resolve international trade 
disputes. Not surprisingly, there has been an absolute explosion 
of litigation since the system finally came into full operation in 
February 1996. Since then there have been no less than 87 cases 
presented to the WTO for resolution, and the pace is increasing. 
Indeed one can express serious concern about whether the 
limited resources of the WTO secretariat   in particular the 
small size of the appellate body which has only seven members 
  will be able to cope with this enormous case-load.
The types of dispute which have been presented to the 
WTO range over a wide number of WTO agreements. Most 
often these concern alleged violation of the GATT agreement, or 
the TRIPS. So far, only five cases have gone the full cycle from 
complaint to conciliation to a panel and to the appellate body. 
These concern agricultural products, environmental legislation 
and taxation.
The Japan Alcohol case is a classic illustration of how private 
industry can use the WTO dispute settlement system. The 
Scotch Whisky Association was the main complainant against 
Japanese domestic taxes on alcohol produce. Effectively it 
claimed that the Japanese local tax on liquor (Shuzeiho) 
discriminated against whisky, cognac and white spirits (all of 
which were exported to Japan) by taxing the Japanese product, 
sochu, less.
The dispute went before the WTO after the Scotch Whisky 
Association persuaded the European Commission to bring a 
formal complaint against Japan. The matter went all the way 
through the cycle up to the appellate body, which finally had to 
determine whether sochu and whisky, brandy and other liquors 
were either 'like' products or 'directly competitive or
substitutable' products under art. 3 of the 1994 GATT. The 
WTO panel and the appellate body both ruled that Japanese 
alcohol taxation rules were a discriminatory protective barrier 
against exports of whisky and similar alcohol products, which 
was unjustifiable. Japan has now announced that it will amend 
its tax laws and open the market in Japan to exports to a much 
greater extent than was the case before.
What is very significant about this case is that the Scotch 
Whisky Association worked hand-in-hand with the European 
Commission, giving it copious information and evidence in 
order for the Commission (with its limited resources of staff) to 
argue the case before the WTO panel.
USING THE WTO SYSTEM
I now want to turn onto the different ways in which the 
WTO dispute settlement mechanism can be used by private 
industry. Naturally, being a European lawyer, my remarks will 
primarily describe the situation in the European Community. 
This is also of relevance for Japanese companies because the 
system in question is the one employed by European companies 
to complain about Japanese exports which they perceive to be 
unfair. At present there are three main ways in which the WTO 
agreements can be used:
(1) a complaint to the Commission using the trade barriers 
regulation;
(2) a direct action before the EC Court of First Instance; and
(3) an action before the national courts of member states.
It should be borne in mind that private parties do not have 
a right to use the WTO system directly. Only sovereign states 
which are members of the WTO can use the dispute settlement 
system. Nor can private parties present their issues to a panel as 
intervenors or as third parties. The exclusion of private parties 
from the WTO has been severely criticised, not least because it 
detracts from the efficiency of the system if relevant evidence 
from the industry affected is excluded. The rule may be changed 
when the WTO's procedures are reviewed.
This exclusion will mean that it will be necessary for an 
industry to persuade its national government to bring any 
complaint before the WTO dispute settlement body. The great 
drawback of this bar to direct access by private companies to the 
WTO is that governments will not always be persuaded to use 
the dispute settlement system mechanism of the WTO, mainly 
because of political reasons and a fear of offending trading 
partners.
THE TRADE BARRIERS REGULATION
In the European system, however, there is a new regulation, 
Regulation 3286/94 (OJ 1994 L349/71), usually called the trade 
barriers regulation. Under this regulation, EU industry has a 
right to complain about perceived violations of WTO 
agreements to the Commission which will then take action on 
its behalf. The Commission is now beginning to take this kind of 
action, having received a large number of complaints following 
much effort on the part of European Commission officials by 
speaking at conferences and meetings of industrial associations, 
to invite people to use this new regulation.
The Commission has received a large number of complaints 
which it is currently processing. These include complaints by 
Italian silk producers against US rules of origin in the textile 
sector; complaints against Argentina in the leather industry;
complaints against US anti-dumping law; and complaints from 
European cognac producers against Brazil. Some (if not most) of 
these complaints will be resolved amicably through consultation 
but others will end up before the WTO.
One of the interesting features of the trade barriers
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regulation is that its definition of Community industry does not 
exclude companies which have their headquarters in Japan, but 
which have substantial production facilities inside the EU, from 
complaining to the Commission under the trade barriers 
regulation. If a Japanese car manufacturer has substantial car 
assembly plants within the European Union, but experiences 
difficulties exporting to a non-EU country (such as Poland), it 
will be able to use the trade barriers regulation in exactly the 
same way as a German or Swedish car manufacturing company. 
The only limitation is that a private company cannot use the 
trade barriers regulation if the barrier complained against is 
regulated by a bilateral EU agreement. So, for example, where a 
Japanese car company exports to Poland, the Commission may 
not be able to act to help the Japanese company if the barrier 
complained about is a matter covered by the Polish-EU 
Association Agreement. In such a case, the Japanese company 
will need the support of an EU member state.
It is obvious that any recourse to the European Commission 
by Community producers will face the basic problem that the 
ultimate decision whether or not to proceed to the WTO will 
rest with the Commission rather than the complainant industry. 
If the Commission decides that it does not wish to take up a 
complaint, there are no real prospects of being able to challenge 
that refusal in the European courts, since the Commission 
enjoys a very wide discretion as to which cases it decides to act 
on in the exercise of its general commercial policy.
DIRECT ACTION BY PRIVATE PARTIES
The French have a proverb that 'one is always best served by 
oneself. Applying this proverb to EC law, there are two basic 
options for a private company, wishing to ensure the observance 
of WTO agreements, which does not succeed in using the trade 
barriers regulation. The first is to attack a Community measure 
directly in the European courts and the second is to attack the 
observance by EU member states of their WTO obligations 
through the national courts. Both ways have some difficulties
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but the prospects for a successful action have dramatically 
improved recently.
To take a hypothetical example, if a Japanese company 
which exports into the EU finds itself blocked by a Community 
measure (such as a Community tax or a regulation ordering the 
way in which a particular market operates), how can it use the 
EC courts to obtain appropriate remedies?
Under art. 17 3 of the EC Treaty, a private company has the 
right to challenge such an EC regulation or decision by the tax 
authorities, provided that it can prove that the Community 
measure is of 'direct and individual concern' to it. The Japanese 
exporter would be able to present an application for the 
annulment of the Community regulation or decision before the 
EC Court of First Instance. It would argue that the EC 
regulation was contrary to the WTO agreements and that it 
should therefore be annulled.
DIFFICULTIES
There are, however, a number of difficulties with this type of 
approach. Under art. 16.4 of the WTO Framework Agreement:
'each member state of the WTO is obliged to ensure the conformity 
of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations 
under the [WTO] Agreement'.
This creates an unambiguous requirement of full 
compliance with WTO obligations by the domestic laws of 
member states. Equally the Community's regulations and 
directives must also comply with WTO requirements. In 
addition to the WTO Framework Agreement, many of the WTO 
agreements have specific requirements that the laws of WTO 
member states establish appropriate legal mechanisms for 
litigation of WTO compliance in their internal legal systems. For 
example, art. 13 of the Agreement on Anti-dumping provides 
that:
'each member whose national legislation contains provisions on 
antidumping measures shall maintain judicial, arbitral or administrative 
tribunals or procedures Jor the purpose, inter aha, of the prompt review of 
administrative actions ... such tribunals or procedures shall be 
independent of the authorities responsible Jor the determination or review 
in question'.
Similarly, the WTO Agreement on Government 
Procurement contains elaborate provisions tor its domestic 
enforcement by private companies in cases of violations of the 
procurement rules of the WTO by states.
However the main question is whether private parties will 
be able directly to enforce compliance on WTO agreements. It 
is well established EC law that in appropriate cases, individuals 
can enforce the EC Treaty against member states where they 
have breached their_treaty obligations. For example, art. 12 of 
the EC Treaty provides that there shall be no new internal 
customs duties between member states. In a leading case dating 
from the start of the EC's history, the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) ruled that individual companies could immediately 
enforce the EC Treaty against member states, even if there was 
a contrary provision of national law.
DIRECT EFFECT
In EC terminology, this is called giving 'direct effect' to EC 
law. Many articles of the EC Treaty have now been held by the 
ECJ to be 'directly effective'. The basic rule is that a provision 
of law must be clear, obviously intended to affect a defined class 
of individuals, and must not rely on further implementation by 
the member states (such as the adoption of new laws to put the 
EC Treaty article into practice). In the case of art. 12 of the EC 
Treaty, it is obvious that the requirement is merely negative, in 
so far as it does not require any further implementation on the 
part of member states; it simply prohibits new taxes on import 
from other member states. It was obviously clear and also 
obviously intended to benefit exporters and other traders of 
member states. It was therefore 'legally perfect'.
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It is now a common occurrence for the European courts to 
rule that such and such an article of the EC Treaty, even though 
addressed to member states' governments, can create rights 
which individuals can enforce. Examples of 'directly effective' 
EC law are the treaty's rules against discrimination (art. 119ff.), 
promoting the free movement of EU citizens (art. 48ff.) and the 
competition rules of the EC Treaty (e.g. art. 85 and 86).
NO DIRECT EFFECT FOR GATT
There have been many attempts to obtain a ruling from the 
ECJ that the GATT and other international agreements to which 
the EU member states are parties are also directly effective.
Broadly speaking, however, the ECJ has made a distinction 
between the association agreements and other trade agreements 
linking the EU and specific states, on the one hand, and the 
international agreements such as the GATT on the other.
In the leading case on EU association agreements, the ECJ 
was asked to consider whether the Portugal EC Association
o
Agreement could be directly effective (this case being brought in 
the days before Portugal became an EU member state). It ruled 
that the trade parts of the Portugal EC Association Agreement 
were clearly intended to benefit individuals, did not require any 
further implementation and could in appropriate circumstances 
be directly enforced by individuals against member states.
Since this case, the ECJ has ruled that a wide variety of EU 
agreements with the outside would be directly effective, at least 
in certain aspects, from aid association agreements, association 
agreements with prospective EU member states to bilateral 
trade agreements.
However, as regards the GATT, the ECJ has taken a 
completely different view. Back in the early 1970s, the 
International Fruit Company tried to obtain a ruling for the ECJ 
that the GATT could have directly effective provisions. The 
Court of Justice rejected these arguments, holding the view that 
the GATT 1947 was not capable of being directly effective, for 
several reasons:
(1) The GATT 1947 was too vague in its terminology to be able 
to create sufficiently precise obligations to make them 
directly effective.
(2) There was no reciprocity between the GATT members, so 
that there was no guarantee that other member states of the 
GATT system would be equally vigilant in enforcing their 
obligations under the GATT Agreement.
(3) The ECJ laid great stress on the fact that the GATT was a 
largely consensual and diplomatic agreement: member states 
could veto th,e adoption of a GATT panel report if they 
disagreed with it.
This denial direct effect for the 1947 GATT has been 
repeated in many subsequent cases before the ECJ. It has been 
strongly criticised by many commentators, but its political 
realism is evident.
EFFECT OF MEMBERSHIP
It may be too early to venture firm opinions on the effect 
within the Community legal order of the EU's membership of 
the WTO. However it is submitted that many of the reasons the 
ECJ gave for denying direct effect to the 1947 GATT are no 
longer valid, following the creation of the WTO and the much
o o
improved dispute settlement mechanism of the Marrakech 
Agreements. The WTO dispute settlement mechanism is 
completely different from the old GATT system. Its chief new 
feature is that it provides for a binding system of arbitration of 
trade disputes with which member states are obliged to comply. 
Would the International Fruit Company receive a different 
answer from the ECJ today? My personal feeling is that it would 
  though, so far, there has been no case on this point.
RECENT CASES
However there are a number of recent cases which would 
seem to indicate that, in an appropriate case, the ECJ would be 
persuaded to grant individuals the right to enforce the WTO 
agreements directly, in other words the WTO agreements might
be directly effective in appropriate cases. In the most recent case 
before the ECJ, the Advocate General of the court said that his 
remarks related:
'exclusively to the GATT in question [i.e. the 1947 GATT]. What 
effects the agreements ... setting up the World Trade Organisation could 
have ... need not be discussed here 1 (Amministrazione delle Finanze delo 
Stato v Chiauita Italia SpA (Case C-469/93) [1995] ECR I-4S33).
This is a very strong hint that if the WTO agreements, as 
opposed to the old GATT agreements, came before the Court of 
Justice, they might receive a different answer. In a more recent 
case, concerning the International Dairy Agreement (one of the 
WTO agreements), the ECJ ruled that:
'when the wording of secondary community legislation [i.e. 
regulations or directives] is open to more than one interpretation, 
preference should be given as Jar as possible to the interpretation which 
renders the provision consistent with the Treaty. Similarly, the primacy of 
international agreements concluded by the Community over provisions of 
secondary community legislation means that such provisions must, so Jar 
as is possible, be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with those 
agreements.' (EC Commission v Federal Republic of Germany [1996] 
ECR 1-3989).
The court concluded in this particular case that the WTO 
International Dairy Agreement applied to import of goods into 
the Community under inward processing relief arrangements.
More generally, it must be observed that many of the reasons 
which the ECJ gave back in 1972 in for denying the direct effect 
of the old GATT agreement are no longer so convincing. First, 
there is reciprocity between the WTO member states. All 
member states have to comply with the WTO and ensure the 
observance of the WTO agreements in their national legal 
systems. As art. 16.4 of the Framework Agreement says:
'each member shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and 
administrative procedures with its obligation under the [WTO] 
agreements 1 .
Secondly, far from being a diplomatic or consensual system, 
the WTO agreements specifically require member states to 
provide means to litigate complaints of lack of compliance. (See 
the examples of the WTO Anti-dumping Agreement and the 
General Procurement Agreement quoted above.) Most 
important of all, the new WTO disputes settlement system is 
legally binding and cannot be frustrated by a veto of the member 
states. This was a chief concern of the ECJ in denying direct 
effect to the old GATT agreement. In all the circumstances, it 
seems that the new WTO agreements, in appropriate cases, 
should be able to be directly effective.
DENIAL OF DIRECT EFFECT
Much attention has been focused on the European Council's 
decision of December 1994 adopting the WTO agreements as 
part of the laws of the EU. In Decision 194/800 (OJ 1994 
L336/1) the European Council made the following declaration:
'by its nature, the agreement establishing the World Trade 
Organisation, including the annexes thereto [i.e. all the WTO agreements 
such as the TRIPS or the new GATT agreement] is not susceptible to 
being directly invoked in Community or member states' courts'.
This is a clear expression of the Council's desire that no 
private litigant should be able to use the WTO agreements in the 
courts of the member states or before the ECJ. As the 
Commission explained in its report of the Council (see
COM(94) 1433 Final), at the time when the decision was taken:
'it is importantJor the WTO agreements and its annexes not to have 
direct effect, that is whereby private individuals who are natural or legal 
persons could invoke it under national law. It is already known that the 
United States and many other of our trading partners will explicitly rule 
out any such direct effect. Without an expressed stipulation of such 
exclusion in the community instrument of adoption, a major imbalance 
would arise in the actual management of the obligations of the 
community and other countries.'
The precise legal effect of the Council's declaration is 
controversial but several observations can immediately be made. 
First there is no statement in the WTO agreement or its various 
individual agreements stating or purporting to state their legal 
effects within the legal systems of the WTO member states. The 
only exception is the introductory note added by the 
Community and the EU member states in their schedule of 
commitments under the GATT; this states that:
'The rights and obligations arising from the GATT, including the 
schedule of commitments, shall have no self-executing effect and thus 
confer no rights directly to individual natural persons or judicial persons.'
Otherwise there are no reservations by the EU states in the 
WTO agreements as to their legal effect within the domestic 
legal system of the member states   a question which must, on 
basic principles of public international law relating to treaties, 
remain a matter for the domestic legal systems of individual 
member states.
Secondly, while there is no legal prohibition on Community 
institutions choosing to declare their views on the legal effects of 
external trade agreements, it is conventional for them to do so 
at the conclusion of such agreements: No such declaration was 
made by the EU on the conclusion of the Uruguay Round 
Agreements, and the Community has been criticised for this lack 
of foresight.
DECLARATION PERSUASIVE ONLY
The Council's declaration remains thus both unilateral and 
ex post facto. Such a unilateral act by the Council cannot, of 
course, alter the legal character of its act, something which only 
the ECJ is competent to decide. The ECJ will respect the 
express stipulations of an international agreement in 
determining the nature of its effects. But in the absence of such 
express determination in the treaty, as in the present case, the 
ECJ will determine the legal consequence of a treaty on a case- 
by-case basis. The unanimous view, denying direct effect to the 
WTO agreements, by the Commission (as negotiator), by the 
Council and the Parliament jointly responsible for their 
legislative adoption, is therefore only persuasive   although such 
persuasiveness may be decisive in the minds of national courts.
It is submitted, therefore, that the Council's declaration in 
Recital 1 1 of the WTO decision is only persuasive, and that the 
ECJ, if called upon to decide the issue, will observe the 
Council's views with all respect due to it but that, in the final 
analysis, it will make up its own mind on the direct effectiveness 
of each WTO agreement provision submitted to its scrutiny. The 
exclusion of the courts which the Council attempts to create as 
regards the WTO agreements in its decision does not have any 
legal force: it is no more than an expression of its potential 
wishes.
ALTERNATIVE METHODS
The alternative method to direct enforcement of the WTO
agreements before the ECJ is through the national courts of the 
member states. For example, if a Japanese company had to pay 
anti-dumping duties which it considered were imposed in 
violation of the agreement on anti-dumping, it could refuse to 
pay the duties levied by the customs authorities of the member 
states and challenge the national measures in the national courts. 
Under English law, this would be an application to the HighO ' 11 O
Court for judicial review of the administrative acts of HM 
Customs & Excise.
The Japanese company would argue that the WTO 
agreements had superior force of law and over-ruled any 
contrary EC legal measure or UK measure made pursuant to the 
EC law. The EC Treaty provides a procedure, known as a 
'reference', whereby such questions of interpretation of the 
validity of national laws compared to the EC Treaty and the law 
that arise from it can be examined by the ECJ. The national 
courts determine which questions of law need to be interpreted 
by the ECJ and then refer them to it while stopping the 
proceedings in the national courts. Effectively this is an effort to 
ensure compliance with WTO's obligations through indirect 
means by way of a sort of compliance review by the ECJ. In the 
case involving the International Dairy Agreement, the ECJ said 
that EC law had so far as possible to be interpreted in 
conformity with international agreements such as the WTO. 
This type of compliance review is being increasingly used in 
anti-dumping cases. t
THREE CASES
So far, there have been three attempts in national courts to 
use the WTO's agreements in this way. Two were brought in the 
High Court in Eondon and one in Ireland. In these three cases, 
which all concern the Intellectual Property' Agreement of the 
WTO (the TRIPS), the national courts were asked to decide 
whether or not to allow direct effect to the WTO agreements. It 
has to be said that the result has been disappointing in the 
English High Court, where the judges were not sufficiently 
aware of international developments to give proper judgments.
In the first case, R v the Comptroller of Patents, Designs and 
Trademarks ex pane Lenzig (not yet reported, 20 December 1996) 
the judge dismissed the arguments that the WTO agreements 
could be directly effective for several reasons. First, he was not 
convinced that the new WTO dispute settlement system was any 
different from the old GATT system. For him it was a 
'distinction without a difference', (thereby ignoring the legally 
binding nature of WTO's dispute resolution and the five cases 
that have gone through the new WTO's procedure). He also laid 
great stress on the Council's declaration denying direct effect to 
the WTO agreements, describing as 'fantastic' the idea that the 
ECJ might decide in a way contrary to the express wishes of the 
15 member states, the Council and the Commission. Of course, 
this was precisely what the European Court has done on many 
occasions, manifesting its traditional independence from the 
politicians in the Council.
Unfortunately, in the second English case, Azrack-Hamway 
International Inc's Licence of Right (Design Right and Copyright) 
Application (1997) RPC 1 34, the judge's attention was not drawn 
to the new dispute settlement mechanism sufficiently clearly so 
that he could understand why the new WTO dispute settlement 
body had fundamentally changed the legal situation. In both 
English cases, applications to enforce the WTO agreements 
direcdy were therefore rejected.
However, a different conclusion was reached in the High7 o
Court in Ireland in Allan &_ Hanbury Ltd v Comptroller of Patents 
Designs and Trademarks (1997) Fleet Street Reports, where the 
grant of a compulsory licence of a patent was overturned 
because it conflicted with the TRIPS Agreement.
There is therefore a conflicting situation where different 
member states at the first level of the court hierarchy have taken 
diametrically opposed views. It will need appeals to the higher 
courts such as the House of Lords for the matter to be resolved.
CONCLUSION
What conclusions can one derive from all this? First, there 
is absolutely no doubt that the new WTO dispute settlement 
system is a success, as is witnessed by the flood of cases that have 
been presented by member states since the introduction of the 
system in February 1996. Indeed, the WTO is a victim of its 
own success, in so far as it is not able to cope with its huge new 
workload.
The European Commission is actively trying to promote the 
interest of Community industry by bringing complaints to the 
WTO. No doubt a similar attitude is expressed by the Japanese 
authorities. However, as discussed above, a Japanese company 
with substantial production facility within the ELI will be treated 
as a Community producer and should be able to use the new 
trade barriers regulation as much as normal Community 
producers.
Secondly, that the recent cases before the ECJ indicate that, 
in an appropriate case, the court may well depart from its past
practice in the 1947 GATT and allow individuals and private 
companies to enforce the WTO agreements directly against 
member states which have breached their obligations. This 
would be a tremendous weapon to use in opening up markets 
and in ensuring that industry obtains full benefits from the new 
WTO agreements.
Thirdly, despite the conflicting results of the cases that have 
so far occurred before the national courts of the member states, 
there appears to be a growing willingness by those courts to 
accept arguments based on international law and the WTO 
agreements. There will sooner or later be a reference to ECJ 
from a national court of a member state which will further 
clarify the extent to which individuals can raise the WTO 
agreements in a national court.
By way of conclusion, I would suggest that when Japanese 
exporters are faced with trade barriers within the Community 
legal system or practices by the European Commission in, for 
example, the application of anti-dumping rules, it should look 
at the possibility of using the WTO agreements as a further 
weapon. After all, the WTO agreements   and the courts which 
are there to give effect to them   were supposed to create a new 
climate for international trade and both Europeans and Japanese 
are supposed to benefit from this. ®
Philip Ruttley
Garretts
This text was originally delivered at a seminar with the Japanese 
Machinery Exporters' Association, held in Tokyo on 11 July 1997
Making its Mark?
«
by Paul Harris & Paul Garland
Recent years have seen a developing picture in the law relating to trade marks. 
Paul Harris and Paul Garland review decisions made under the Trade Marks Act 
1994 and look at a number of passing off cases.
W e have now had just over two years of the new substantive and procedural approaches to trade marks and whilst there have been a few surprises, 
from the litigation point of view, it would generally be fair to say 
that there has been a lot 'more of the same'.
Passing off actions, too, have slowly been evolving and the last 
two years' important cases are digested below.
TRADE MARK REGISTRY PRACTICE
The case of Konings Graanstrokrij (NV) 's Application — St Trudo 
Trade Mark [1995] FSR 345, though not heard in the registry,
related to Trade Mark Registry practice. Konings Graanstrokrij 
NV applied to expunge two marks for St Trudo in Classes 32 
and 33 registered in the name of McCormick (UK) pic. The 
application was dealt with on the basis of the transitional 
provisions of the Trade Marks Act 1994.The application succeeded 
and the concurrent jurisdiction of the registrar and the court 
was preserved and noted.
However, the main point of this case, which gave rise to great 
concern amongst trade mark agents at the time was that Mro to
Justice Ferris held that second-hand or more remote hearsay 
evidence was inadmissible in rectification proceedings; the strict
